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ABSTRACT: This paper reviews the history of AI & Law research from the perspective of 
argument schemes. It starts with the observation that logic, although very well applicable to legal 
reasoning when there is uncertainty, vagueness and disagreement, is too abstract to give a fully 
satisfactory classification of legal argument types. It therefore needs to be supplemented with an 
argument-scheme approach, which classifies arguments not according to their logical form but 
according to their content, in particular, according to the roles that the various elements of an 
argument can play. This approach is then applied to legal reasoning, to identify some of the main 
legal argument schemes. It is also argued that much AI & Law research in fact employs the 
argument-scheme approach, although it usually is not presented as such. Finally, it is argued that 
the argument-scheme approach and the way it has been employed in AI & Law respects some of 
the main lessons to be learnt from Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument.  
 





In the early days of Artificial Intelligence & Law research there was a sometimes heated debate 
about the suitability of logic for modelling legal reasoning. Logic, it was said, could not cope 
with the vagueness, indeterminacy and adversarial nature of the law (e.g. Berman and Hafner, 
1987). Now we know that this criticism was not justified and that logical methods can also be 
applied when arguments for opposite conclusions are possible. For instance, techniques from 
nonmonotonic logic have been used to model reasoning with hierarchies of possibly conflicting 
rules (see Prakken and Sartor, 2002 for an overview) and even to model aspects of reasoning with 
precedents (e.g. Prakken and Sartor, 1998; Prakken 2002). However, even if these modern 
techniques are used, a logical approach still has some limitations and it needs to be supplemented 
with other elements. The point is that the notion of a logical inference is very abstract. The logical 
validity of an inference purely depends on the meaning of some structural words involved in the 
inferences, such as the connectives (and, or, if, not, ...) and the quantifiers (all, some, most, ...). 
However, sentences that are indistinguishable from a logical point of view can very well play 
different roles in an argument. This point was perhaps first stressed by Toulmin (1958), who in 
his famous scheme for arguments distinguished a claim connected to data by a warrant on 
account of a backing, and subject to exceptions specified by a rebuttal. Perhaps more important 
than Toulmin’s particular scheme is his general observation that the various elements of an 
argument can play different roles, which leads to different standards for evaluating arguments.  
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Consider by way of illustration the following sentences:  
 
All Dutch men are tall 
All email addresses are personal data 
 
From a logical point of view, both sentences are universally quantified implications. However, 
from an epistemological point of view they are clearly different. The first sentence is an empirical 
statement about a certain class of animals, while the second sentence is a legal rule interpreting a 
certain legal concept.   Someone who disagrees with the first sentence will use different ways of 
attacking it than someone who disagrees with the second sentence.   Attacks on the first sentence 
will typically refer to empirical observations (“yesterday I saw a short Dutchman”) or to 
empirical methodology (“your sample is biased”). By contrast, attacks on the second sentence 
will usually refer to a legal source (relevant statutes), to legal authority (“the Dutch supreme court 
ruled otherwise”) or to principle or policy (“regarding email addresses as personal data allows the 
use of privacy protection laws against spam”). Sometimes arguments about empirical statements 
are also source-based (“How do you know that all Dutch men are tall?” “Henry told me, and he is 
Dutch, so he is in the position to know.” “But Henry often lies.”). However, even within the class 
of empirical statements there are clear differences. Compare 
 
Dutch men usually like soccer 
Witnesses usually speak the truth 
 
Both sentences are empirical generalisations but the second one is more, since it also expresses a 
source of knowledge while the first does not. Because of this difference, the second statement can 
be attacked in ways that do not apply to the first. For instance, it can be attacked on the grounds 
that a witness is biased, or has malfunctioning senses. Of course, debates about the first sentence 
could also evolve into a debate about sources, if it is asked what the source is of this 
generalization. But the sentence itself does not express a source of knowledge.  
The general point of these examples is that the use of sentences in arguments does not 
only depend on their logical form but also on other things, such as their epistemological or 
pragmatic nature. Logic, with its abstract definition of logical validity (whether deductive or 
nonmonotonic), is blind to such differences, and should therefore be supplemented with a so-
called “argument-scheme” approach. In line with Toulmin (1958), such an approach can identify 
the different roles that the various elements of an argument can play and thereby paves the way 
for a field-dependent notion of validity of arguments. The reason is that different types of 
premises have different ways of being critically examined and, since different fields can have 
their own typical argumentation schemes, the criteria for evaluating arguments will differ for each 
field.     
Argumentation theory is the only research area where the notion of argument schemes (or 
“argumentation schemes”) is explicitly studied as such. However, in this paper I want to argue 
(following Gordon 2003) that much AI & Law research in fact also employs the argument-
scheme approach and thus takes some of Toulmin’s main lessons to heart. In doing so, it is not 
my aim to give a comprehensive overview of AI & Law research. Rather, I will use a select set of 
examples from the AI & Law literature to illustrate the argument-scheme approach. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I explain the notion of an 
argument scheme as it is studied in argumentation theory, followed by a brief discussion in 
Section 3 of how argument schemes can be formalised in AI models of commonsense reasoning. 
In section 4 I briefly sketch the main phases of legal problem solving, viz. proof of the facts, rule 
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interpretation and rule application. In the subsequent sections (5-7) I then discuss some of the 
main argument schemes used in each of these phases and some of the AI & Law projects 
modelling these schemes. In Section 8 I discuss some limitations of the argument-scheme 
approach to legal reasoning and in Section 9 I conclude by discussing how all this work in AI & 
Law can be seen as developing the research program suggested by Toulmin (1958).  
 
2 ARGUMENT SCHEMES 
 
In this section I sketch the main ideas behind the argument-scheme approach in argumentation 
theory. The notion of argument schemes is one of the central topics in current argumentation 
theory. For a recent overview see Garssen (2001). Important contributions to the study of 
argument schemes have been made by Douglas Walton (e.g. 1996). As conceived by him, 
argument schemes technically have the form of an inference rule. Consider, for instance, the 
following scheme from epistemic reasoning of  “arguments from the position to know” (Walton 
1996, pp. 61-3): 
 
Person W says that p 
Person W is in the position to know about p 
Therefore (presumably), p  
 
(Note the resemblance to our example “witnesses usually speak the truth” from the introduction. 
In fact, the latter sentence is an instance of this scheme.) Or consider the following scheme from 
practical reasoning, of “arguments from consequences” (Walton 1996, pp. 75-7): 
 
If A is brought about, then good (bad) consequences will (may plausibly) occur. 
Therefore, A should (not) be brought about. 
 
Our “all email addresses are personal data” example from the introduction may be transformed 
into an argument from good consequences: 
 
If the term “personal data” of the Dutch Data Protection Act is interpreted to include 
email addresses, then legal measures against spam become possible, which is good.                                                                
Therefore, the term “personal data” of the Dutch Data Protection Act should be 
interpreted to include email addresses. 
 
Argument schemes are not classified according to their logical form but according to their 
content. Many argument schemes in fact express epistemological principles (such as the scheme 
from the position to know) or principles of practical reasoning (such as the scheme from 
consequences). Accordingly, different domains may have different sets of such principles. 
Argument schemes come with a set of critical questions that have to be answered when assessing 
whether their application in a specific case is warranted. Some of these questions pertain to 
acceptability of the premises, such as ‘is W in the position to know about p?’ or ‘is the possibility 
to use legal means against spam really good?”. However, other questions point at exceptional 
circumstances in which the scheme may not apply, such as ‘is W sincere?’ or “are there better 
ways to bring about these good consequences?”. Clearly, the possibility to ask such critical 
questions makes argument schemes defeasible, since negative answers to such critical questions 
are in fact counterarguments, such as “Person W is not sincere since he is a relative of the suspect 
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and relatives of suspects tend to protect the suspect”. Another reason why argument schemes are 
defeasible is that they may be contradicted by conflicting applications of the same or another 
scheme. For instance, a positive instance of the scheme from consequences can be attacked by a 
negative instance of the same scheme, such as by “interpreting email addresses as personal data 
also has bad consequences, since the legal system will be flooded with litigation, so the term 
“personal data” should not be interpreted to include email addresses”.  Or one person in a position 
to know (say an eyewitness) may have said that the suspect was at the crime scene while another 
eyewitness may have said that the suspect was not at the crime scene. Or a witness testimony may 
be rebutted with an argument from another scheme, such as an argument using camera evidence. 
Above I said that argument schemes are classified according to their content.  However, 
from a logical point of view they can be transformed into instances of logical inference rules by 
adding the connection between premises and conclusion as a conditional premise. Since as just 
explained most argument schemes are defeasible, this conditional will also be of a defeasible 
nature.  For instance, the scheme from the position to know can be transformed into: 
 
Person W says that p 
Person W is in the position to know about p 
Persons who are in the position to know usually speak the truth  
Therefore (presumably), p  
 
And the scheme from consequences can be transformed into 
 
If A is brought about, then good (bad) consequences will (may plausibly) occur. 
If bringing about A will (may plausibly) result in good (bad) consequences then,  
other things being equal, A should (not) be brought about 
Therefore (presumably), A should (not) be brought about. 
 
Thus both schemes become an instance of the defeasible modus ponens rule, which is formalised 
by many systems of nonmonotonic logic (for an overview see Horty 2001): 
 
P 
If P then usually Q 
Therefore (presumably), Q 
 
This scheme can be attacked by arguing that there is an exception to the rule that if P then usually 
Q (for instance, P & R and If P & R then usually not-Q) However, the fact that such a logical 
reconstruction of argument schemes is possible should not be taken to mean that the notion of 
argument schemes has no point. The point is that the two argument schemes above are typical 
ways in which the inference scheme of defeasible modus ponens can be instantiated, each with 
their own typical ways of critical testing, and that they therefore merit independent study instead 
of merely as instances of this abstract inference scheme. 
 
3 A FORMAL FRAMEWORK FOR REASONING WITH ARGUMENT SCHEMES 
 
I now briefly outline a formal framework for modelling reasoning with argument schemes. It 
especially draws on work of myself and others on argument-based approaches to so-called 
nonmonotonic reasoning.  This outline also illustrates the remarks made in the introduction that 
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(new) logical tools exist that can cope with uncertainty, disagreement and exceptions. The logical 
account of argument schemes outlined in this section was first proposed by Prakken et al. (2003). 
Independently, Verheij (2001) suggested a similar account in the context of his “Deflog” logic 
and developed it in e.g. (Verheij 2003). 
The fact that argument schemes leave room for counterarguments naturally points at an 
argument-based approach to the formalisation of reasoning with such schemes. To this end, so-
called logics of defeasible argumentation are in principle very suitable. Such logics were 
developed in AI to formalise commonsense reasoning (see Prakken and Vreeswijk, 2002 for an 
overview) and they have been popular in AI & Law as a way to formalise the adversarial nature 
of legal argument (see e.g. Gordon, 1995; Prakken and Sartor 1996, 1998; Bench-Capon 2003, 
Verheij 2003). Essentially, such logics define arguments as trees of deductive and/or defeasible 
inferences (such as deductive or defeasible modus ponens) and they allow for attacks on the 
defeasible inference steps of an argument (such as attacking defeasible modus ponens by arguing 
that there is an exception to the rule). For present purposes the work of the philosopher and AI 
researcher John Pollock (e.g. 1995) is especially relevant, since he classifies defeasible inference 
rules according to general principles of epistemology and practical reasoning. He calls his 
defeasible inference rules prima facie reasons.  One such reason is the perception principle:  
 
Having a percept with content p is a prima facie reason to believe p. 
 
Other prima facie reasons studied by Pollock are, for instance, the statistical syllogism (a 
probabilistic version of defeasible modus ponens) and principles of memory, induction and 
temporal persistence. 
As in all systems of logic, In Pollock’s system an argument can be attacked by denying 
one of its premises (in fact I am ignoring some technical complications here). In addition, Pollock 
allows arguments to be attacked in two ways.  An argument can be rebut with an argument for the 
opposite conclusion, and it can be undercut with an argument why a prima facie reason does not 
apply in the given circumstances. Intuitively, undercutting attacks do not argue that the attacked 
conclusion is false, but only that the conclusion is not sufficiently supported by its premises. Note 
that thus Toulmin’s notion of a rebuttal in fact corresponds with Pollock’s notion of an 
undercutter. An example of an undercutter is that if somebody perceives an object of red colour, 
then an undercutter of the perception principle is that the object is illuminated by a red light. For 
an example of an undercutter in a legal context, consider the argument “The suspect was at the 
murder scene at the time of the murder since witness John saw the suspect there” (applying the 
prima facie reason from perception; note that this reason can be applied only if it is first argued 
with a position-to-know argument that John saw this because he says that he saw it.). This 
argument is undercut by “It was too dark, so John could not have made a reliable identification” 
(applying an undercutter of the perception scheme). 
How does Pollock’s system relate to the argument-scheme approach? Essentially, the 
answer is that argument schemes can be formalised as prima facie reasons, that applications of 
schemes resulting in opposite conclusions can be regarded as rebuttals, while negative answers to 
critical questions about exceptional circumstances correspond to undercutters. The possibility that 
arguments can be defeated accounts for the defeasibility of argument schemes (recognised by 
Toulmin in his notion of a “rebuttal’’), while the notion of undercutters allows for field-
dependent standards for evaluating arguments, since each scheme has its own undercutters. 
This is not all there is to say about argument-based logics. Given a set of conflicting 
arguments, it must be determined whether some of these arguments prevail. This is done in two 
steps. Firstly, standards can be used for comparing conflicting arguments to see which one is 
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stronger than the other, if any. For instance, in case of two conflicting arguments from good 
consequences, one might (other things being equal) prefer the argument about the consequences 
that are judged the most important (e.g. in our example one might prefer the value of protecting 
the legal system against too much litigation over the value of fighting spam).  Next, when all 
relations of relative strength between conflicting arguments are determined, the dialectical status 
of an argument is defined, to identify the defeasibly valid inferences. An important phenomenon 
here is reinstatement: suppose that argument B is stronger than argument A but that B is itself 
attacked by a stronger argument C; in that case C reinstates A.  Consider again our rebutting 
arguments based on two conflicting witnesses (call them John and Bob). Even if we would prefer 
Bob’s testimony given that, say, he is an adult and John a child, the argument using Bob’s 
testimony may be undercut by a third argument C “Bob’s testimony is unreliable since he has a 
strong reason to hate the suspect”.  
An intuitive way to define the defeasible validity of arguments is in the form of an 
argument game between a proponent and an opponent of an argument. Proponent starts the game 
with the argument to be tested and then the players take turns, each attacking the preceding 
argument. Opponent’s arguments must be at least as strong as their targets while proponent’s 
arguments must be stronger than their targets. A player has won if the other player has run out of 
moves. Now an argument A is defeasibly valid if the proponent has a winning strategy (in the 
game-theoretic sense) in a game beginning with A, i.e., if he can make the opponent run out of 
moves no matter how she plays.  
In sum, argument-based logics conceive of argumentation as a tree of trees: individual 
arguments are trees in which statements are linked with each other by inference rules, and the 
dialectical status of arguments is determined by forming a dialectical tree of all possible ways to 
play an argument game for this argument. An argument is defeasibly valid if the proponent can 
choose his arguments in the dialectical tree in such a way that he always ends in a leaf with one of 
his own arguments. 
 
4 A BRIEF SKETCH OF LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING 
 
Let us now take a closer look at legal reasoning, to identify some of the main argument schemes 
used in it. (The analysis in this section is not meant to be original; it merely serves as a basis for 
the further discussions.) I will take my starting point in the phenomenon of a statutory rule that 
has to be applied to the facts of a case. A typical legal rule is of the form 
 
If Conditions then Legal consequence 
 
A legal rule connects the factual world with the normative world.  Consider the following 
paraphrase of a legal rule from the Dutch Data Protection Act. 
 
If personal data is reused without the subject’s permission for means irreconcilable with 
the aims for which the data were collected, then the reuse is not allowed.   
 
Consider now the following (entirely real) case.  Somebody claims, firstly, that Utrecht 
University has given the addresses of all their students without their permission to the local police 
in order to enable the police to start a campaign against bicycle theft (a very common criminal 
offence in Dutch university towns) by sending all students a letter to warn them that buying a 
stolen bicycle is itself a criminal offence. The person also claims that this was not allowed since 
 7
this goal is irreconcilable with the aim for which these addresses were collected, viz. to manage 
the university administration with respect to their students. Now if such a case is taken to court, at 
least four questions have to be answered. 
The first question is whether all these events indeed happened. This is a matter of 
evidence. It will be decided on the basis of the available ‘sense data’, such as, for instance, the 
letter of the police and further documentary evidence (e.g. a letter of request from the police to 
the university board) and/or witness testimonies (e.g. a statement by a police officer that they 
obtained the addresses from the University).  
Suppose that on the basis of this evidence the court is convinced that the events indeed 
occurred. Then a second step has to be taken to classify the events under the conditions of the 
rule, viz. interpreting the rule’s conditions to decide whether it subsumes the events as proven by 
the ‘sense data’. A well-known problem here is that often there are no clear criteria for this 
decision, because of the vagueness or open-texturedness of the rule’s conditions. This is the 
question to which most of the AI & Law research on legal argument is devoted.  
Suppose now that the court has decided that the events as proven indeed classify as an 
instance of the rule’s conditions, for example, on the grounds that preventing theft of bicycles has 
nothing to do with running the university administration.  Then two further questions have to be 
answered. The first is whether the rule is legally valid, i.e., whether it is from a legally recognised 
source of law. This question must be answered independently of the facts of the case. This is 
different for the final question to be answered, viz., whether the rule must be applied to the case 
at hand, or whether there are circumstances that prevent the rule’s application (e.g. a conflicting 
rule also applies, or applying the rule would be manifestly unjust or unreasonable). Perhaps the 
university could argue that the negative consequences for its students and employees are so small 
and that the problem of bicycle theft in Utrecht is so serious while no other measure has worked 
that applying the rule in this case is unreasonable. Perhaps the university can even cite a 
precedent where the rule was set aside in a similar case. 
In sum, statutory rule application involves (at least) four steps: proving that the facts to 
which the rule is claimed to apply have indeed occurred (evidence), deciding that the facts as 
proven are subsumed under the rule’s conditions (classification/interpretation), deciding that the 
rule is valid  law (rule validity) and deciding that the rule ought to be applied (rule application).  
It should be noted that this four-step process is in general not sequential. For instance, the 
choice of facts to be proven is determined not only by the available evidence but also by the 
possible rules that may fit the facts once proven. If a university student in our example thinks that 
a claim on the basis of breach of contract is more promising than a claim on the basis of privacy 
violation, she might select different facts-to-be-proven, such as that a contract exists, and she 
might accordingly search for different items of evidence. Modelling this process of reinterpreting 
the facts to fit a certain rule has so far proven too hard for AI & Law research (cf. e.g. Branting, 
2003). 
Let us now have a closer look at each of the four steps, discussing some of the main 
argument schemes involved and some of the AI & Law research on modelling these schemes.  
 
5 SCHEMES FOR REASONING ABOUT EVIDENCE 
 
Until the 2003 Conference on AI & Law in Edinburgh, reasoning about evidence was a largely 
neglected area of AI & Law research. One exception was Lutomski (1989), who presented an 
early application of the argument-scheme approach to evidential reasoning at ICAIL-1989 in 
Vancouver. His system, which was implemented but, to my knowledge, never used in practice, 
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was meant to assist an attorney in dealing with statistical evidence in the domain of employment 
discrimination. The system stored typical arguments based on statistics in a Toulmin structure, 
together with typical critical questions (for instance, “have all and only relevant data be 
collected?”).  
At ICAIL-2003 a considerable number of papers addressed the topic of evidential 
reasoning. One of them was my paper with Chris Reed and Douglas Walton (Prakken et al. 
2003), in which some first steps were taken to develop an explicit argument-scheme analysis of 
evidential reasoning. This work was further developed in Bex et al. (2003) and Prakken (2004). In 
this section I briefly summarize this work.  
The basic idea is to formalise evidential argument schemes in John Pollock’s framework 
(see Section 3) as prima facie reasons and to regard the critical questions attached to the schemes 
as pointers to undercutting defeaters. Some of Pollock’s own reasons directly apply to evidential 
reasoning, such as the perception principle discussed in Section 3 and principles based on 
memory, induction and the statistical syllogism. The latter principle is Pollock’s probabilistic 
version of defeasible modus ponens. I paraphrase it in a version without numbers: 
 
‘c is an F’ and ‘F’s are usually G’s’ is a prima facie reason for ‘c is a G’ 
 
This principle drives reasoning with empirical generalisations. The main undercutter is 
subproperty defeat, which captures exceptions to a generalisation: 
 
 ‘c is an F&H’ and ‘it is not the case that F&H’s are usually G’s’ is an undercutter of the 
statistical syllogism. 
 
For example, an argument using “Dutch men usually like soccer” may be undercut by an 
argument using “It is not the case that Dutch men with a PhD degree usually like soccer”. 
Applying both generalisations to the author of this paper results in a defeated argument that 
Henry likes soccer, although no argument for the opposite conclusion can be built. 
In addition, Bex et al. discuss argument schemes for applying witness testimonies 
(essentially a variant of the scheme of arguments from the position to know), expert testimonies 
(another variant of this scheme) and temporal persistence. The latter reason can be used to argue 
from the fact that a fact F is true at a time T1 that F is still true at a later time T2, if there is no 
evidence that F became false between T1 and T2. Temporal persistence is an important aspect of 
evidential reasoning. For instance, in civil cases the usual way to prove that one has a legal right 
(e.g. ownership) is to prove that the right was created (e.g. by sale plus delivery). The other party 
must then usually prove later events that terminated the right. Prakken (2004) also discusses 
several ways to attack empirical generalisations that do not employ the subproperty defeater but 
that attack the sources of the generalisations (such as ‘common sense’ or ‘science’). Bex et al. 
(2003) applies the approach of Prakken et al. (2003) to a small part of Kadane and Schum’s 
(1996) reconstruction of the famous Sacco and Vanzetti case (viz. their Chart no. 4). The 
arguments that resulted from this reconstruction turned out to be based on Pollock’s reasons from 
memory, perception, temporal persistence and the statistical syllogism and on the “position to 
know” scheme as reconstructed as an instance of the statistical syllogism (cf. the end of Section 2 
above). The counterarguments that were not rebuttals could all be analysed as undercutters of 
these schemes.  
This work is still preliminary. One direction of future research is attempting to formalise 
the schemes that practicing lawyers use in their cases. For common-law jurisdictions interesting 
sources of such schemes exist, viz. manuals for trial advocacy, such as Bergman (1997).  By and 
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large, this manual (implicitly) follows the argument-scheme approach, listing typical evidential 
arguments and typical ways to attack them. Another valuable research direction is capturing the 
available knowledge about the reliability of eyewitness testimonies in a knowledge-based system 
(cf. e.g. Bromby and Hall, 2002). 
 
6 SCHEMES FOR RULE APPLICATION 
 
Applying a legal rule to the facts is perhaps the central element of legal problem solving. One of 
the most elaborate AI & Law accounts of what it takes to apply a legal rule is given by Hage and 
Verheij in an application of their “reason-based logic” (see e.g. Hage 1997, Verheij 1996).   Their 
central claim is that applying a legal rule involves much more than just applying the logical 
inference rule of modus ponens (whether defeasible or not). Their account of rule application can 
be briefly summarised as follows. First it must, of course, be determined whether the rule’s 
conditions are satisfied (the interpretation question). If this hurdle is cleared (see also Section 7), 
it has to be determined whether the rule is legally valid (for instance, by arguing that it is from a 
certain legally recognised source).  Then it has to be determined whether the rule’s applicability is 
not excluded in the given case (for instance, the Dutch Data Protection Act does not apply to the 
police.). If this is the case, it must finally be determined that the rule can be applied (i.e., that no 
conflicting rules or principles apply). Interestingly, while Hage and Verheij mainly discuss how 
rule application can be blocked by legal principles, the CABARET system of Skalak and Rissland 
(1992), only allows rule application to be blocked by citing a precedent where the rule was not 
applied (see also Section 8). CABARET’s approach is based on Gardner’s (1987) point of view 
that if a legal principle or value justifies setting aside a rule, this will usually have been decided in 
a precedent.  
Both Hage and Verheij and others (such as Gordon, 1995 and Prakken and Sartor 1996) 
have shown how arguments about these issues can be formalised in nonmonotonic logics. Among 
other things, these techniques can model the fact that in legal practice the validity and 
applicability of legal rules is usually presumed, a presumption which can be overturned only by 
an argument that it does not hold. The details of the techniques used are beyond the scope of the 
present paper, except for the remark that they in fact formalise and further develop Toulmin’s 
notion of a rebuttal; see Prakken and Sartor (2002) for an overview of the various techniques. For 
present purposes the main conclusion is that the argument scheme for rule application involves 
various steps and that each of these steps can be attacked in stereotypical ways. 
 
7 SCHEMES FOR PRECEDENT-BASED REASONING  
 
In the previous section I briefly mentioned that most AI & Law research on the modelling of legal 
argument concerns the interpretation of legal concepts. This is a very hard research problem, 
since often a large gap exists between the concrete nature of the facts of a case and the abstract 
nature of legal concepts. This induces legal uncertainty in (at least) two ways.  
The first way is the existence of conflicting interpretation rules (based, for instance, on 
opinions of legal experts, on commonsense interpretations of natural language or on the rationale 
of a precedent). For instance, one judge (or legal scholar) may say that email addresses are always 
personal data since when combined with an IP address of a computer they enable the 
identification of the user, while another judge or legal scholar may argue that an email address is 
 10
not personal data if the left part of the address does not resemble the user’s name. These are 
simply conflicting if-then rules, and any suitable technique from nonmonotonic logic can be used 
to formalise reasoning with such rules (see again the survey in Prakken and Sartor 2002).  This is 
essentially the approach taken by Gardner (1987). Her (implemented) system, which investigated 
whether a contract was created by offer and acceptance, stored possibly conflicting interpretation 
rules derived from legal experts, commonsense and case law, and applied these rules in modus-
ponens style, using a priority mechanism to give precedence to case law rules over conflicting 
expert or commonsense rules. 
However, sometimes interpreting a legal concept is not a matter of simply formulating or 
selecting a suitable interpretation rule.  Sometimes all there is, is a set of different factors, 
possibly with different magnitudes, that somehow have to be weighed in each particular case to 
determine its outcome. A well-known AI & Law example is HYPO’s modelling of the American 
precedent-based domain of trade secret law (Ashley 1990). However, this phenomenon is not 
confined to common law jurisdictions. For instance, the Dutch Data Protection Act, when 
defining the concept of irreconcilable reuse of personal data, states five factors that “at least” 
have to be taken into account, without stating how they should be combined in a given case: 
• the similarity between the aim of the reuse and the original aim for which the data were 
collected; 
• the nature of the data involved;  
• the consequences of the reuse for the person to which the data pertain; 
• the manner in which the data were obtained; 
• the extent to which suitable measures are taken to protect the privacy of the person to 
which the data pertain. 
In such ‘factor-based’ domains, a decision in a new case is often made by referring to past 
decisions, i.e., to precedents. However, as shown by e.g. Ashley, the rationales of precedents 
often do not directly apply to a new case since different cases often have different constellations 
of the relevant factors and their values. Therefore, the rationales must often be adapted to fit the 
new case.   A typical way to do so is to point at the similarities to a precedent with the desired 
outcome, to argue that because of these similarities the same decision should be made in the new 
case. And two typical ways to attack such an argument are, firstly, distinguishing the precedent 
by pointing at the differences and, secondly, pointing at a counterexample, i.e., at another 
precedent that is at least as similar and that has the opposite outcome. All this (and more) is 
modelled in the HYPO system. It is interesting to note that HYPO uses such precedent-based 
arguments in the context of an argument game (see Section 3 above) between a plaintiff and 
defendant in a certain case. In fact, the disputes thus generated by HYPO are at most three moves 
long (plaintiff-defendant-plaintiff) but nothing prevents a generalisation to disputes of arbitrary 
length. Thus HYPO illustrates that reasoning with precedent-based argument schemes can be 
modelled as a logical argument game.  
The HYPO system is now more than 15 years old and much research has followed it. 
Most of the subsequent research consists of enriching HYPO’s scheme for representing 
precedents and exploiting the added expressiveness for generating new kinds of arguments and 
counterarguments. While HYPO just distinguishes sets of pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant factors 
and a simple decision (plaintiff won or defendant won), in the CATO system (Aleven 1997) 
hierarchies of more and less abstract factors can be defined so that, for instance, a distinction can 
be downplayed by arguing that at a more abstract level the cases are still similar.  Consider the 
following example in the context of Dutch privacy law, where one case is about a single sending 
of a warning letter by the police to students while another case (also entirely real) is about a 
single sending of a fund raising letter by the university to their students and employees. The cases 
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could be distinguished at this factual level but the distinction could be downplayed by arguing 
that both cases are about one-time letters about matters of public interest.  Others, e.g. Prakken 
(2002), Bench-Capon and Sartor (2003) and Atkinson et al. (2005) have tried to represent the 
values that are advanced or endangered by deciding a case in one way or another, resulting in the 
modelling of new, teleological argument schemes, related to Walton’s argument scheme from 
consequences. For instance, in Prakken’s (2002) approach a distinction can be emphasised by 
saying that because of the differences between the precedent and the current case, following the 
precedent in the current case will not advance the same values as were advanced by the 
precedent’s outcome.  
 
8 LIMITATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT SCHEME APPROACH 
 
Concluding this brief overview of AI & Law research, we have seen that an argument-scheme 
approach to the modelling of legal argument is a useful supplement to a purely logic-based 
approach. In particular, an argument-scheme approach can model the different roles that the 
various statements in an argument can have and thus allow for different standards for evaluating 
arguments. We have also seen that much AI & Law research in fact employs the argument-
scheme approach, although it usually is not presented as such. 
Perhaps at this point the reader has the impression that all that modelling legal reasoning 
is about is modelling the relevant argument schemes and associated critical questions, and using 
them in a logical argument game as explained in Section 3. However, this would be a severe 
simplification of legal reasoning, and much interesting work in AI & Law goes beyond this 
simple approach. 
  For instance, CABARET (Skalak and Rissland 1992) defines strategies and tactics for 
using and combining rule- and precedent-based schemes for certain dialectical purposes, such as 
confirming or discrediting a rule. Thus Cabaret in fact defines rational strategies for playing an 
argument game. And part of the HYPO and CATO systems are mechanisms for interpreting 
existing material before using it in an argument. For instance, CATO still uses HYPO’s simple 
case representation scheme but CATO’s factor hierarchy can be used to generate different 
arguments about why a case was decided the way it was, by suggesting different ‘paths’ from the 
factors to the decision through the hierarchy. The idea of reinterpreting precedents was further 
developed by Loui and Norman (1995), who model five ways to reinterpret the (precedent-based) 
arguments of one’s opponent in order to reveal new attacking points so that they can be better 
attacked. One way is to argue that in the precedent the outcome was based on choosing between 
two conflicting arguments, and that in the new case the winning argument does not apply since 
one of its premises is missing in the new case, so that the argument that was overruled in the 
precedent should now prevail. Finally, Bench-Capon and Sartor (2003) have addressed the 
problem of theory formation, by modelling constructors for theories that explain a certain set of 
precedent decisions. All this is very important work but it goes beyond the argument-scheme 
approach. Either it provides the material from which arguments can be built (CATO, Loui and 
Norman, Bench-Capon and Sartor) or it defines tactics and strategies for how an argument game 




9 AI & LAW AND TOULMIN 
 
Finally, it is interesting to discuss how all this AI & Law work respects the observations of 
Toulmin (1958). To start with, the reader might wonder why AI & Law has not made more direct 
use of Toulmin’s argument scheme. Here Toulmin’s own reflections on his 1958 work are 
relevant. In the preface of his second edition (Toulmin, 2003) he expresses his surprise that many 
regarded his 1958 scheme as a proposal for a theory of argumentation while his aim had been 
different, viz. to criticise the view that all arguments can be put in deductive form. We should 
therefore not be surprised that subsequent research has replaced Toulmin’s original single 
argument scheme with revised and more refined classifications of schemes. In line with this, it 
seems more worthwhile to investigate how AI & Law has taken the general lessons of Toulmin 
(1958) to heart than to discuss how AI & Law has used Toulmin’s particular scheme. 
In my opinion, AI & Law has taken to heart the following three of Toulmin’s (1958) 
lessons. Firstly, Toulmin stressed that premises of an argument can have different roles. We have 
seen that AI & Law has identified many argument schemes with stereotypical roles for premises. 
Secondly, Toulmin stressed that everyday arguments are defeasible, which he captured in his 
notion of a rebuttal. It has been argued many times before that the field of nonmonotonic logic 
has formalised and further developed this aspect of Toulmin’s scheme, and the logical account of 
reasoning with argument schemes outlined in Section 3 illustrates this point. Finally, Toulmin 
stressed that the standards for evaluating arguments are field-dependent. His original argument 
scheme captured this by allowing for different backings of warrants. The account of Section 3 
illustrates that it is possible to capture similar distinctions in a system of formal logic (be it a 
nonmonotonic logic), if the logic allows for the formalisation of different argument schemes, 
each with their own set of typical premises. Then the field-dependency of the standards can be 
captured by identifying the schemes employed in a certain field and formulating the undercutters 
that correspond to the critical questions of these schemes. Since different fields can have their 
own typical argumentation schemes, the criteria for evaluating arguments will thus differ for each 
field. 
Concluding, while AI & Law has replaced Toulmin’s original argument scheme with 
more refined analyses, it has done so fully within the spirit of Toulmin’s challenge to develop an 
account of the validity of reasoning that applies to everyday argument. What is especially 
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